BANK OF BARODA RECRUITMENT 2017 COMING SOON

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As per the notice published in employment news today Bank of baroda has annouced vacancies for the post of JMGS Scale l from 1st apr 207. We will update it as soon as official notyfication uploaded on site.

EDITORIAL PICK FROM THE HINDU FOR SBI PO 2017

It is eerie how each decade, with one exception, 1960, has ended badly for the economy — a pattern that has been maintained throughout the 77 years India has been independent. 1949 was the immediate aftermath of the Partition and the British decision to cheat on its sterling obligations; 1969 was the year the Congress party split; 1979 is described above; and as we shall, in 1990, India almost went bankrup

The years 1999 and 2009 were not much better. In both the economy performed very poorly. Most annoyingly for the Indian economy, the 1970s ended very badly. Inflation shot up at one point to 27 per cent; the forex reserves dwindled to alarmingly low levels; 1979 became the worst drought year in a century; and political instability came back with a vengeance with there being only a caretaker government from July 1979 to January 1980.

Indira Gandhi came back as Prime Minister in January 1980 and almost immediately she agreed to approach the IMF for a loan under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) which is a soft loan window of the IMF with a longer repayment period of three or four years for countries that have run into a balance of payments problem because of what the IMF calls ‘structural weaknesses’. The loan comes with strings attached, the most important of which is that the borrower must give up its old policies of state control. From the IMF’s point of view this was a ‘walk into my parlour situation’ because it had been trying since 1966 to get India to change its statist policies, to no avail. From India’s point of view, the loan was needed so that it would be able to buy Mirage fighter aircraft from France.

The US knew what India was up to and tried to block it. But eventually India managed to get the approval of the IMF board. To do so, it made several commitments about ‘structural reform’. The Indian government’s letter to the IMF was leaked to The Hindu. Just who leaked it is not known but there are various theories, (including one that The Hindu’s correspondent there, a Brahmin, befriended the Brahmin cook of a Brahmin official).

The aftermath

There was the usual political storm, led by the Left but nothing came of it. Indira Gandhi stood firm domestically and agreed to do as bidden by the IMF. But in her usual way she wriggled out of the commitments.

Not just that. She also declined the last tranche due in 1983 because the next year was an election year and she could not afford the strict fiscal discipline that India had been made to observe since 1982. In actual fact, there was a lot of fiscal subterfuge. India also carefully hid its actual level of reserves. The result was that it ended up with the Mirage fighters and the IMF didn’t quite get what it wanted.

For that it would have to wait till a really big balance of payments crisis hit India in 1991. But in 1981, the emphasis was on containing inflation, which meant a very tight monetary policy, stringent credit policies and targeting, if not achieving, a lower revenue deficit which had surfaced after a very long time in 1980.

The RBI, under Patel who knew about the secret negotiation with the IMF, really tightened the monetary screws, raising the CRR and the bank rate. The SLR was also raised to 35 per cent. By September 1981, however, it was clear that these measures were not working and in October that year, Patel tightened money even further by raising the CRR from 7 to 8 per cent in the busy season. He was told by many not to be so severe but he went ahead anyway to make sure that the IMF’s ceiling on money supply growth was met. It was, in February 1982.

Indeed to meet the IMF’s requirements on expenditure ceilings, the government was even forced to ask public sector companies to deposit their excess cash in the treasury instead of leaving it in the banks because deposit growth in the first half of 1981 had been very high, leading to higher-than-needed credit growth.

The RBI’s official history says that the government had decided to undertake structural reform even before being told by the IMF to do so. But another theory is that it decided to only pretend that it was doing so because it badly wanted that EFF loan to be able to use its own foreign exchange for the Mirages.

***

Inflation, growth and RBI

But in 2008, the RBI under its new governor, fresh from heading the Finance Ministry, was suffering from a joined-at-the-hip syndrome. It would take Subbarao another three years before he started to act independently by which time it was too late.

Between 2008 and 2011, however, when he got a two-year extension, the RBI was fully compliant with the government’s requirements, requests and requisitions. It was almost as if he was in complete awe of the government.
[3/29, 12:56 PM] atul: The three men who called the shots were all at the peak of their powers — Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who was widely credited in 2009 with having won the general election; C Rangarajan, who headed the Prime Minister’s Economic Affairs committee (PMEAC) where Subbarao had been his number two; and Montek Singh Ahluwalia who headed the Planning Commission and who was, as Manmohan Singh’s daughter would later write, almost like his son.

Subbarao was practically bludgeoned into following a very loose monetary policy as part of the ‘stimulus’. A combination of domestic political, global and personal factors led India to inflate the economy to such an extent that in 2010 its GDP growth almost reached the magic double-digit figure of 10 per cent.

Prices were growing faster than output, and the product gave the higher growth rate. The birds would come home to roost in Subbarao’s last two years as governor in 2012 and 2013. Inflation went into double digits, especially food inflation. Industrial growth had come at a cost to the poor, who would retaliate in 2014 by voting the Congress government out and a BJP government in with a simple majority for the first time since 1984. If there was one thing other than corruption that contributed to the Congress defeat — it crashed to just 44 seats in 2014 from 208 in 2009 — it was inflation.

The RBI played a major role in that denouement and Subbarao’s compliant attitude during his first term as governor will have to be counted as an important factor in it. He overlooked the most important charge that the RBI Act makes on the RBI — inflation control.

It now turns out that he also failed in controlling the banks in their lending spree to big borrowers who would subsequently virtually refuse to return their loans, running into several lakhs of crores.

Changing factors

The attitude of the RBI between 2009 and 2012 is reflected in the speeches its governor and deputy governors were making. On the one hand there was a dramatic increase in the number because the old practice of only the governor and deputy governors speaking in public was given up, and even executive directors started to speak on the public fora, resulting in considerable confusion.

On the other hand, they spoke about everything except the main problem — inflation. Even when they did speak about it, it was on a defensive note, wherein they sprayed a lot of academic red herrings.

The fact their old adversary, the government, which was leading them by the nose, was completely overlooked. The mode was more justificatory than combative, accommodative than adversarial. It was as if the RBI had collectively decided to bury Reddy’s ghost. In effect, the RBI became the most articulate advocate of fiscal expansion and monetary laxity.

In that major sense, the years 2009-11were amongst the most inglorious years of the RBI. Soon after he got his second term in September 2011, Subbarao started becoming critical of the government.

He spoke repeatedly about inflation, growth, politics, the laws of economics and the laws of physics which they were supposed to resemble but didn’t. Reams have been written about this sudden turnaround. They do not, however, take away from a simple fact: he was trying to shut the stable door after the horses had bolted.

The economy went into a steep downward spiral from which it is still to recover. Not to put too fine a point on it, despite his best intentions and efforts, it must be said that Subbarao failed to do his job. He allowed both prices and bad loans to rise, thus failing on the macro side as well as the regulatory side.

These two are the most important tasks which the RBI is charged with. It may sound very harsh but to the extent that a person must be judged by the outcomes he delivers, it is true. You judge a batsman by the number of runs he scores and a bowler by the number of wickets he takes. Nothing else matters.

TCA Srinivasa Raghavan began his career in 1975 as the economics editor at Macmillan India. In 1980, he switched to journalism. Over the next thirty-three years he worked with the Free Press Journal, Eastern Economist, Financial Express, Indian Express, Business Standard and The Hindu BusinessLine. Between 2004 and 2011, he was a consultant with the RBI.

SYNDICATE BANK PO RESULT 2017

Syndicate Bank PO Result 2017 is published in two stages – Result of Syndicate Bank PO 2017 exam held on 26th February 2017 indicates the list of candidates who qualified the exam and are called for GD-PI; Final Syndicate Bank PO 2017 Result indicates the candidates who have cleared all rounds and are offered admission to PGDBF program. Candidates can check here Syndicate Bank Probationary Officer (PO) 2017-2018 Result here for each stage and download
Syndicate Bank PO admit card for next stage (GD-PI) online.

Important Schedule of Syndicate Bank PO Result is given below.
Event
Schedule
Syndicate Bank PO Exam
26 Feb 2017
Syndicate Bank PO Result ( Online Test )
March 2017
Syndicate Bank PO GD / PI
April 2017
Syndicate Bank PO Result ( After GD / PI )
May – Jun 2017
Syndicate Bank PO 2017 Result

REASONING FOR SBI PO 2017

Directions (1-5): Study the following information carefully and answer the questions given below:

Each of the six persons A, B, C, D, E and F belongs to a different tribe among P, Q, R, S, T and U. Each of them belongs to one of the four countries Bhutan, China, Mangolia and Pakistan. At least one and at most two persons belong to each of the four countries. Each of them knows exactly one language among Spanish, French, Dutch and Swedish. At least one and at most two know each of these four languages. No two persons have the same combination of country and language. The following information is known about them.
F and C belong to the same country and A and D belong to different countries.
E belongs to China and tribe T. The person who belongs to tribe P knows Swedish.
Two persons know Dutch and two persons belongs to each of Bhutan and Pakistan.
 B belongs to Bhutan. Two persons the one who belongs to the tribe R and B know French. C knows Dutch and belongs to tribe Q.
Neither A nor the person who belongs to Pakistan knows French.
The persons who are belonging to the tribes Q and U know the same language.

Q1. Which language does D know?
(a) French
(b) Spanish
(c) Swedish
(d) Dutch
(e) Cannot be determine

Q2. C belongs to which tribe?
(a) P
(b) S
(c) Q
(d) R
(e) Can not be determine

Q3. Who belongs to Mangolia?
(a) E
(b) A
(c) B
(d) D
(e) C

Q4. Four of the following five are alike in a certain way and hence they form a group. Which one of the following does not belong to that group?
(a) R
(b) Q
(c) S
(d) U
(e) P

Q5. Which of the following language A know?
(a) French
(b) Spanish
(c) Swedish
(d) Dutch
(e) Cannot be determine

Directions (6-8): Study the following information carefully and answer the questions given below:
‘A @ B’ means ‘A is sister of B’
‘A % B’ means ‘A is son of B’
‘A $ B’ means ‘A is mother of B’
‘A # B’ means ‘A is father of B’

Q6. How is D related to W in the given expression?
T @ Q % D $ P # W
(a) Mother
(b) Grandfather
(c) Grandmother
(d) Can’t be determined
(e) None of these

Q7. How is A related to B is the given expression?
V $ B # E @ M % A
(a) Husband
(b) Brother
(c) Son
(d) Wife
(e) None of these

Q8. Which of the following symbols should come in place of the question mark (?) to make the expression H is grandfather of E?
D % H # T ? K # E
(a) @
(b) %
(c) $
(d) #
(e) Can’t be determined

Ans

S1. Ans.(a)
Sol.
S2. Ans.(c)
Sol.
S3. Ans.(d)
Sol.
S4. Ans.(e)
Sol.
S5. Ans.(d)
Sol.

QUIZ ON APPROXIMATION FOR SBI PO 2017

Directions(1-10): What approximate value should come in place of question mark (?) in the following questions?

1). (789.689÷25)% of 2160 = ?+180.892
a) 509
b) 502
c) 620
d) 590
e) 420

2). (17.85)2×6.05 + (43.02)2×7.49=?
a) 15728
b) 18728
c) 16728
d) 14728
e) 12728

3). 67.485%of 6480-(2342.87÷65)=?
a) 4070
b) 4270
c) 4770
d) 4370
e) 4170

4).68%of4096+17%298.878-1875=(?)^2
a) 21
b) 541
c) 461
d) 31
e) 331

5). (√3968.659)%of7300÷149.569=?+2086
a) 2013
b) 2453
c) 2513
d) 2813
e) 2523

6). 1439÷16×14.99+√228=?
a) 1315
b) 1365
c) 1215
d) 1465
e) 1265

7). (11.92)2+(16.01)2=?2×(3.85)^2
a) 15
b) 2
c) 4
d) 55
e) 5

8). (19.97%of781)+?+(30%of87)=252
a) 40
b) 50
c) 25
d) 70
e) 80

9). 820.01÷21×2.99+?=240
a) 105
b) 173
c) 123
d) 234
e) 143

10).299÷12×13.95+?=(24.02)^2
a) 285
b) 225
c) 325
d) 150
e) 185

Answers:
1).b)
2).c)
3).d)
4).d)
5).c)
6).b)
7).e)
8).d)
9).c)
10).b)

THE HINDU EDITORIAL FOR SBI PO 2017

As it courts Pakistan and wades into Afghan diplomacy, the question is whether Russia is truly a world power

“Strategy is the central political art,” writes Lawrence Freedman in Strategy: A History. “It is about getting more out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It is the art of creating power.” If this is so, consider the case of a country that is economically smaller than Italy, Australia, or South Korea. Its economy has indeed shrunk over the past two consecutive years, and income per capita sits below that of Malaysia or Slovakia. Male life expectancy is worse than in North Korea. Worse still, the country has been sanctioned by five of its six biggest export markets, and its currency has lost half its value over the past three years alone. And yet, this country — which is, of course, Russia — has somehow succeeded in projecting itself as a great power in virtually every corner of the world stage. But as Moscow turns its attention to South Asia, courting Pakistan and wading into Afghan diplomacy, we should ask whether it has truly created power, or merely spun an illusion.

Aggressive diplomacy

Reasonable people can disagree on the strategic balance sheet. Territorially, Russia is in the black. It has annexed Crimea, controls a swathe of eastern Ukraine through proxy rebels, and enjoys access to military facilities in Syria, Iran, Egypt, and soon enough Libya. Diplomatically, it has driven a formidable wedge between Turkey and NATO, while deepening ties with Western allies from Israel to Japan. It has also persuaded China to sign an agreement on “global strategic stability”, while the two sides hold naval exercises in the South China Sea.

All this has come at a cost. As long as Russia continues to fuel a Kargil-type war in Ukraine, it will continue to be battered by European and U.S. sanctions. Yet Russia’s trade with Europe is still four times larger than that with China, suggesting that Beijing offers a rather limited safety net. Russian defence expenditure is likely to fall this year and next, with nuclear modernisation taking a larger slice of the budget. Meanwhile, Russia’s ‘victories’ have also prompted the first-ever deployment of NATO forces at the Russian border, without the presence of the Cold War-era Warsaw Pact buffer. Even neutral states are alarmed, with Sweden to reintroduce conscription next year. Meanwhile in Washington, Russia’s audacious election meddling has made it a toxic quantity in Congress and in parts of the administration, making it hard to envisage a grand bargain, even setting aside the serious differences over Iran and arms control.

In short, Russia has gained diplomatic influence at the cost of goodwill and growth, while enmeshing itself in several open-ended wars. But whether or not one judges this trade-off to have been worthwhile, there is a deeper point: influence demands investment. Russia has created power only where it has been able to change facts on the ground, usually by force of arms, and only where larger, richer, and more cohesive Western forces have dithered or abstained.

In Ukraine, Moscow’s initial arm’s-length low-profile intervention faltered until Russian troops flooded in. Russian advisers in Syria, who were present long before 2015, could not stop the rot — until Russian air power showed up. Russia has been flirting with renegade Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar for some time, hosting him aboard the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov in January as an eye-catching gimmick. But it is Russia’s deployment of special forces to Libya’s borders this month that’s far more important. In all these cases, from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf, Russia is a bigger part of the conversation because it has taken risks, and put down chips.

The South Asian game plan

In South Asia, by contrast, Russia’s presence is largely smoke and mirrors. Its flurry of activity in the region is by now well known. Last September, Moscow batted away Indian objections to hold its first-ever joint drills with Pakistani special forces, having earlier agreed to sell four attack helicopters to Pakistan. In next-door Afghanistan, Russia’s moves have been even starker. In December 2015, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, declared that “Taliban interests objectively coincide with ours”, while both Afghan and Western officials decried Russian support to parts of the insurgency. At the Heart of Asia conference a year later, Mr. Kabulov followed this up by playing down Pakistan’s role and rebuking an Indian journalist who had asked about this. Contrast this to the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, who told Congress in February that as long as insurgents’ “senior leaders remain insulated from pressure and enjoy freedom of action within Pakistan safe havens ... they have no incentive to reconcile”. Then, in the same month, Russia infuriated Kabul by holding a trilateral summit with Pakistan and China.

Russia’s intentions are plain. In systematically exaggerating the Islamic State’s presence in Afghanistan, the aim is to weaken the U.S. and discredit what, in actual fact, have been remarkably successful U.S.-Afghan counterterrorism efforts.

Meanwhile, Russia can pose as a powerful regional broker. But a campaign of disinformation, bluster, and summitry can only take Moscow so far in the absence of any actual leverage. NATO countries have 14,000 troops in Afghanistan, while Russia has none. Indeed, even Italy (over 1,037 troops), Germany (980) and Georgia (870) are all more important than Russia on the ground. If the new U.S. administration increases troop numbers in Afghanistan, as seems possible, this will further constrain Moscow’s ability to persuade Kabul to attend similar summits which cut out the combatant powers.

Steady economic slide

Meanwhile, Russia is poorly endowed in other key respects. In economic terms, it is an irrelevance. Its trade with India, Pakistan, and Iran has actually fallen in recent years. Russian aid to Afghanistan is trivially low, and it is no position to offer concessionary terms for significant defence sales to Pakistan. While Pakistan hungrily absorbs Chinese investment and India looks globally for an infusion of capital, Russia has almost nothing to offer, beyond the politically opaque machinations of state-dominated energy companies.

Much more meaningful is Russia’s defence engagement with India. Russian arms sales continue to be a strategic factor in Indian defence policy. One key aspect is the lease of a second nuclear submarine. A second is the sale of the advanced S-400 air defence system. These are significant long-run contributions to India’s subsurface operations and air power, respectively. Russia’s most advanced defence technology is certainly a rare and valuable asset. But these deals provide limited leverage. They are commercially important to Russia’s frail defence industry, and Russia’s market share is being ruthlessly shrunk by Israeli and American competition. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, it is Chinese arms — built on a Soviet legacy, Moscow would note, ruefully — that are cornering the market.

Where does all this leave Russia? To some extent, prestige is itself a currency of power. If Russia appears ascendant, thanks to land-grabs in Europe and air strikes in Aleppo, it will be so. It will be sought by friends, consulted by neutrals, and discussed by all. But these efforts must have some solid foundation. There must be the possibility, if not the promise, of some economic, political, or military effect. In an age of geopolitical uncertainty — the rise of China, the growth of nationalism, and the erosion of U.S. leadership — hedging is prudent. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India all have good reasons to reinforce ties to Russia, though each is differently placed to weather the potential consequences. But even if it had the resources, Moscow’s room for manoeuvre would be very limited. NATO is not going to pull out of Afghanistan entirely, China looms far larger in Pakistan and in the region more generally, and Russia’s Afghanistan-Pakistan gyrations have hardly endeared it to New Delhi. What are we left with? Sound, fury, but not much clout.

Shashank Joshi is a Senior Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute in London

DI FOR SBI PO 2017

Directions (1-5) : Refer to the diagram below and answer the questions that follow.

To percentage break-up of the total income of 5 sales man

1. If the total income of O is Rs. 6000 and of N is Rs. 7000, find the difference in their salaries ?
1. Rs. 1500
2. Rs. 1750
3. Rs. 2000
4. Rs. 2250
5. None of these

2. If the total income of P is Rs. 8000, find the interest he earns from his savings ?
1. Rs. 1500
2. Rs. 1000
3. Rs. 3000
4. Rs. 2000
5. None of these

3. If the incentives of N amounts to Rs. 2000, find his monthly salary ?
1. Rs. 8000
2. Rs. 4000
3. Rs. 6000
4. Rs. 2000
5. None of these

4. If the incentives of M are Rs. 3000, his salary is __________ of his total income.
1. 1/4
2. 1/2
3. 2/3
4. 3/4
5. None of these

5. Which of the following is true ?
I. The salary of M is more than that of P.
II. The salary of N is equal to his incentives.
III. The salary of M is equal to interest earned by N from his savings.
1. Only I
2. Only II
3. Only III
4. II and III
5. None of these

Ans